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ESSAY

US BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE POSTUNCED ENVIRONMENT
FRANKLYN P. SALIMBENE*

If one image has captured the imagination of scientists, politicians,
and business leaders over the last several years, it is the image of the
world as a global village. It is "global" because people are more aware
than ever of the reach and effect of their activities on the whole planet,
and it is a "village" because directing those activities to life-sustaining
ends requires the cooperation of every nation working and pulling together as members of the same community.
Nowhere did this image of the global village loom larger than at
last summer's United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio de Janeiro. The clarion call for the conference came in a document entitled Agenda 21.1 Characterizing humanity as standing "at a defining moment in history,"2 the document noted
that the continued, long-term prosperity and well-being of each country
could only be achieved "in a global partnership for sustainable development" joined in by all countries. The means of achieving that sustainable development was for the nations of the global village to take "a
balanced and integrated approach to environment and development
questions." 3
To encourage this global integration, the participants at Rio proposed a series of statements and conventions for adoption by the nations of the world. In addition to Agenda 21, these statements and conventions included the Rio Declaration,the Statement of Principles on
Forests, the Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity. The aim of each document is fundamentally the
same, the achievement of "a more efficient and equitable world
* Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law and Research Fellow at the Center for Business Ethics at Bentley College, Waltham, Massachusetts.

1. U.N.

CONFERENCE ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, DRAFT AGENDA

1.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/4 (Part 1), U.N. Sales No. E. 92.1.16 (1992).
2. id.
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economy."'

On a theoretical level, one would be hard-pressed to argue with
the basic premise of UNCED. Yet, as the conference approached,
there was considerable concern that the industrialized, developed countries would reject the offer of this partnership for sustainable development with the less developed countries (LDC). In fact, there was good
reason for concern. Several weeks before the start of UNCED, the
Bush administration stated that in its view, the Convention on Biological Diversity was "fundamentally flawed." 6 Citing unsatisfactory language on property rights, development funding, and biotechnology
transfer, the Department of State announced that the United States
would not sign the treaty. Following this decision, press reports indicated that Japan and many European nations would follow the lead of
the United States in rejecting the treaty.6 While these reports ultimately proved to be incorrect, the United States remained firmly
opposed.
This U.S. opposition was grounded in the fear that the biodiversity
treaty simply did not provide adequate protection for the intellectual
property rights of those who would invest in the technology needed to
promote biodiversity. In fact, the Department of State noted that, in its
view, the convention focused on intellectual property rights "as a con7
straint to the transfer of technology rather than as a prerequisite."
Without protection, the United States argued that owners of technology would be deprived of their rights to property and would refuse to
share new biotechnology. 8 Such an unfortunate development would endanger the very objectives which the treaty sought to accomplish.
In view of the unyielding position of the United States at the Rio
conference, the U.S. business community might conclude that the overall results of UNCED are antithetical to its interests. In this author's
view, such a conclusion would be unfounded and unprofitable. There
was, after all, much at the conference that was encouraging. The
United States did sign the climate convention 9 and it did join in UNCED's acceptance of the idea that environmental protection is compati-

4. Id. 72. 1.
5. Convention on Biological Diversity, 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 423 (1992).
6. Keith Schneider, U.S. Will Oppose Species Treaty That Would Promote Preservation, N.Y. TIMEs, May 30, 1992, at Al, A4.
7. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 5.
8. Fact Sheet: US Environmental Accomplishments in Support of UNCED, 3
U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH. SUPP. 9, 11 (July 1992, Supp. 4).

9. Id. at 2.
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ble with economic development.1 0 Further, the protection of property
rights which so motivated the United States in its opposition to the
biodiversity agreement may still be achieved despite the language of
the treaty. There are several grounds to support this conclusion. First,
however, it is important to understand the historical context of the debate regarding property which has been ongoing between the developed
countries and the LDC.
Two Perspectives on Development
Amidst the poverty of the developing world, the LDC have generally viewed the accumulation of property, and thus economic growth,
as being dependent upon preferential treatment. The LDC seek such
preferential treatment from the developed countries, which have the
capital and the technology to transform their poverty into wealth. They
realize that the role of property in economic growth is crucial and that
the industrialized nations as the owners of that property have to share
it. Thus, the developing countries have sought preferences in the form
of trade concessions in bilateral commercial treaties; in the formation
of international codes of conduct governing not only nations, but also
private sector transnational activities in the developing world; and in
multilateral trade negotiations like those under the GATT. 1 In the
early 1970s, the United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a
New International Economic Order energized this movement towards
preferences. 12 In it, the General Assembly gave as one of the founding
principles of the new order, "preferential and non-reciprocal treatment
for developing countries."1 3 The declaration further affirmed the right
of a nation to full, permanent sovereignty over all economic endeavors
within its borders including the right to nationalize foreign activities

10. E.U. Curtis Bohlen, Report to Congress on Rio Conference, Statement before
Subcommittee on Oceanography, Great Lakes, and Outer Continental Shelf of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs (July 21, 1992), in 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH
Supp. 31, 32 (July 1992, Supp. 4).
11. Regarding references to preferences for developing countries in international
codes of conduct, see Proposed Text of the Draft Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations,Economic and Social Council, 2d Sess., Agenda Item 7(d), 26, 29, and
36, U.N. Doc. E/1990/94 (1990). For a discussion of the issue of preferential treatment for developing countries as it relates to GATT negotiations on trade in services,
see New Issues in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Centre on
Transnational Corporations, at 14, 38, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/19 (1990).
12. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Comm., 6th Spec. Sess.,
Agenda Item 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201 (S-VI) (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715
(1974).
13. 13 I.L.M. 718(n) (1974).
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and to transfer title of foreign-owned property to its nationals.1 ' Specifically addressing the activities of transnational businesses, the declaration asserted the right of a nation to regulate and supervise those businesses by taking measures based upon its own national economic policy
objectives.15 These assertions of "host nation" sovereignty and preferences have been echoed in discussions at the United Nations over the
last two decades in conferences relating to transnational corporate activities, technology transfer, and restrictive business practices. 6
The developed countries, for their part, while gradually coming to
accept the idea of preferences, have been careful to assure that foreign
direct investment by their nationals in developing countries be protected by an international set of rules which would guarantee a minimum standard of treatment regardless of host state policy objectives. 7
This minimum standard would measure "the legitimacy of the conduct
of host States in their treatment of transnational corporations."' 8 In
effect, it is the view of developed countries that international rules
aimed at safeguarding the property interests of the industrialized nations will temper state sovereignty. Because of their insistence on a
minimum, internationally-accepted standard for the protection of foreign-owned property, the United States, the United Kingdom, and several other industrialized nations in 1974 not only issued official reserva.tions to the adoption of the UN declaration on the new economic
order,' 9 but also voted against passage of a companion document, The
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.0
From this position, the United States and other developed countries have argued that the protection of property in transnational business activities is essential if LDC development is to take place. The
14. Id. at 717(e).
15. Id. at 717(d).
16. E.g., Report of the Second United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects
of the Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Re83-90,
strictive Business Practices, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF. 3/9 (1991); CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

at 9-10, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/4, U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.A.15 (1986) [hereinafter CODE OF CONDUCT].
17. CODE OF CONDUCT, supra note 16.
18. PATRICK ROBINSON, THE QUESTION OF A REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT

ON TRANSNATIONAL

CORPORA-

TIONS 2, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/1, U.N. Sales No. E.86.II.A.5 (1986).

19. See 13 I.L.M. at 744, 762 (1974).
20. Charterof Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX),
U.N. GAOR 2d Comm., 29th Sess., Agenda Item 48, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281
(XXIX) (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M 251 (1975).
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secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has even come to share this view. In a report issued
on the status of negotiations relevant to the Draft International Code of
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology,2 1 the secretariat noted that
given the importance attached by suppliers to the protection regimes of potential recipient countries, stronger protection could
lead to greater willingness to transfer technology, particularly
new technologies. There is growing evidence that the existence
of a 'protection gap' among countries might lead to delays in
technology transfer, with potential technology suppliers insisting upon adequate protection in the recipient countries before
proceeding with the relevant investment or technology
transfer.22
Such protection would have the effect of encouraging foreign direct investment by transnational businesses. The result would be more investment opportunities for technology suppliers and more development opportunities for developing countries.
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
Primarily because of this long-term position regarding property
rights, the United States decided not to sign the Convention on Biological Diversity. While several offending clauses were referred to in the
U.S. Declaration opposing the treaty, the U.S. representative reiterated
the Bush administration position that "[a]s a matter of substance, we
find particularly unsatisfactory the text's treatment of intellectual property rights . . .technology transfer and biotechnology."2 3 The text of
the biodiversity treaty relating to these issues is Article 16. In sum,
Article 16 requires of each contracting party that it:
(1) undertake to provide and/or facilitate access for and transfer to other countries of technologies that are relevant to
conservation;

21. The Relevance of Recent Developments in the Area of Technology to the Negotiations on the Draft InternationalCode of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology,
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, at 38, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/55.
(1990) [Hereinafter Recent Developments].
22. Id.
23. United States: Declaration Made at the United Nations Environment Programmefor the Adoption of the Agreed Text of the Convention on Biological Diversity, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 848 (1992).
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(2) take legally binding steps to provide to developing countries
which supply genetic resources access to and transfer of technology "including technology protected by patents and other intellectual property rights"; and
(3) take legally bindings steps "with the aim that the private
sector facilitates access to, joint development and transfer of
technology ... for the benefit of both governmental institutions
and the private sector in developing countries." '24
While it was expected that other developed countries would oppose
the treaty on similar grounds, they did not. Even the United Kingdom,
a staunch proponent of property rights, ultimately agreed to sign the
treaty. Fiona McConnell, head of the British delegation at Rio, characterized the possibilities for technology transfer under the biodiversity
treaty as an "exciting breakthrough." 2 5 She added, "[it means that
when developing countries contribute something they will get a share in
the benefits." 2 6 The "something" given to investors in exchange for
technology transfer was access to genetic materials. In the British view,
the quid pro quo was worth it.
Unmoved by the British argument and the otherwise universal opposition to the U.S. position, Michael Young, the alternate head of the
-U.S. delegation at UNCED, provided a press briefing in which he argued that the adoption of the treaty would lead to a high level of international regulation of the biotechnology industry. The result would be
a disincentive for companies to engage in the kind of work that would
produce the very technologies that the world needed and that UNCED
was trying to encourage." At a subsequent press briefing, William
Reilly, head of the delegation, put the point more bluntly. Asked if the
United States government would require that American industry share
its intellectual property, Reilly responded, "[w]e will not under any circumstances require that our industry share its patents or make available its technology on concessional terms. That is what we considered
objectionable in the treaty .

24. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development: The Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
25. Jane Perlez, 98 Nations Adopt Biological Treaty; U.S. May Not Sign, N.Y.
TIMES,

May 23, 1992, at Al, A5.

26. Id.

27. U.S. Delegation Press Briefings (June 8, 1992), in 3
Supp. 22, (July 1992, Supp. 4).
28. U.S. Delegation Press Briefings (June 12, 1992), in 3
Supp. 22, 27 (July 1992, Supp. 4).
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The Meaning for U.S. Business
How should U.S. business leaders view the discussion at the Rio
conference? In particular, what effect should the U.S. position regarding the biodiversity treaty have on international business decisions
made by U.S. businesses involved in technology transfer? The simple
answer is that while raising a caution for business leaders, the results of
UNCED should not discourage robust U.S. participation in the development and transfer of technology. There are four important considerations which provide support for this answer.
First, research in and development and transfer of sound technologies offer enormous business opportunities for those companies willing
to make the investment. Transfer of that technology from the industrialized developer to the foreign user amounts to the exportation of
knowledge.29 As an intangible asset, once developed and utilized,
knowledge in the form of technology can greatly increase the wealth of
the owner.8 0 In its study of recent developments in the area of technology, the UNCTAD secretariat has found evidence that royalties on
new technology licenses have increased by over ten percent in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology fields since 1980.31 In 1992, one com32
mentator indicated that royalties can be as high as twenty percent.
Much of this wealth potential can be realized through the development
and transfer of technologies, which both protect the diversity of the
world's forests and exploit that diversity in the achievement of sustainable development. For example, the Brazilian copaiba tree, which produces liquid hydrocarbons, and a newly-discovered Mexican corn plant,
which grows as a perennial, are just two biological discoveries that have
the potential, with the proper technology, of promoting biodiversity, assisting in the LDC's development, and providing economic gain for
those countries that develop and transfer the technology.33 Other types

29. For a discussion of the opportunities in technology transfer in nonchlorofluorocarbon development, see David R. Chittick, The Transfer of NonChlorofluorocarbon Technologies: A Case-Study in Industry Cooperation, in ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND TECHNOLOGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 194, 195, U.N.

Doc. ST/STD/ATAS/7, U.N. Sales No. E.92.II.A.6 (1992)

[hereinafter

SOUND

TECHNOLOGY].

30. See generally Juan R. Zarco, Legal and Financial Techniques for Technology
Transfer to Developing Countries, in SOUND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 29, at 181 (ex-

plaining that technology transfers can be financed creatively to minimize costs and
liabilities).
31. Recent Developments, supra note 21, at 16.

32. Zarco, supra note 30, at 182.
33. Thomas J. Goreau, Technological Options to Minimize the Loss of Biological
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of environmentally sound technologies need to be developed and utilized in many areas including transportation, refrigeration, and agriculture. In the field of energy, the requirements of the LDC will increase
greatly as they struggle to establish their own industrial base and
thereby their own development. In view of this, some responsible commentators believe that the United States should give a high priority to
the transfer of environmental technologies that increase energy efficiency and minimize the net release of greenhouse gases.34
Second, there is the moral dimension. Much of the emphasis in
every United Nations effort regarding development over the last twenty
years has been on the need to improve the quality of life for all citizens
of the world, and especially for those in the developing countries. The
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order (1974) and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
(1974) both take their cue from Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which affirms that "[e]veryone has the
right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical
care and necessary social services .

. . .""

This lesson is surely not lost

on a country that sends its armed forces half-way around the world in
order to feed the starving masses in Somalia. Technology has a transforming effect; it has improved the basic human condition in those nations that could afford it. The link between technology and economic
development is clear.3 In this linkage, business entities have a social
responsibility. The moral dimension impels those businesses that own
life-sustaining technology to share it for the betterment of the human
condition. The responsibility of U.S. corporate entities, for example, is
understood to encompass not only the obligation to return a profit to
shareholders, but also the duties owed to consumers, employees, and
the community within which the business operates.3 7 As businesses expand their operations into the international community, it follows that
Diversity, in SOUND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 29, at 67-68.
34. E.g., Mark S. Kasman, Economic and Legal Barriersto the Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technologies to Developing Countries, in SOUND TECHNOLOGY,
supra note 29, at 162, 169.

35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 25 (1948).
36. See, e.g., Zarco, supra note 30; David P. Hanson, The Ethics of Development
and the Dilemmas of Global Environmentalism, in BUSINESS ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE 185-194 (Michael Hoffman et al. eds., 1990).
37. See, e.g., A. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the Moral Management of Organizational Stakeholders, BUSINESS HORIZONS,
July/August 1991, at 39-48; P. Murphy, Creating Ethical Corporate Structures, 30
SLOAN MGMT. REV.

81 (1989).
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they likewise expand the orbit of their social responsibility. Businesses
that operate within the global village have a responsibility to it.
A third consideration which should encourage U.S. business enterprises to engage in technology development and transfer is an apparent
softening in the attitude of developing countries. Their hardline stance
of the 1970s encouraged by the declaration of the "new economic order" has given way to the realization that behavior which threatens
foreign-owned investment is self-defeating. Foreign direct investment
"has the potential to bring substantial benefits to host economies, in
terms of capital inflows, transfer of technology and skills, employment,
purchasing power and linkages to the world economy." 3 Despite this
promise, the 1980s turned out to be a period of economic stagnation
and decline for many LDC. Speaking as the representative of the developing countries at a United Nations development conference in
1990, India characterized the 1980s as a "lost decade of development." 9 The irony was that while the LDC experienced a lost decade,
the annual flows of foreign direct investment by transnational corporations grew by more than 300 percent between 1984 and 1989 alone, to
the level of $200 billion.4 Aware of the lost opportunity, LDC behavior
has changed. One result has been a dramatic decrease in the number of
expropriations of foreign-owned property by the LDC. At the height of
activity in the 1970s, as many as eighty-three incidents of expropriation
occurred in one year-1975. By the end of the 1980s, that number fell
to an average of less than three per year. "1 Another result has been the
wholesale revision by many developing countries of their foreign direct
investment laws. These revisions have liberalized those laws to attract
transnational corporate activity. Specifically, many less developed countries today are allowing foreign investors tax concessions, free repatriation of profits to their home countries, exemptions from local fees, discounts on the cost of real estate leases, accelerated rates of
depreciation, and more."2

38. David Gold, The Determinantsfor FDI and Their Implications for Host Developing Countries, 31 CTC REP. 21, 21 (1991).
39. Report of the Second United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of
the Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, supra note 16, 1 83.
40. Gold, supra note 38, at 21.
41. John Kline, A New Environment for the Code, 29 CTC REP. 2, 2 (1990).
42. See generally A.B.M.M. Islam and Neema Mujmudar, Trends and Issues in
FDI Laws in Least Developed Countries, 30 CTC REP. 7 (1990) (demonstrating that
there is a trend towards liberalization in the recent legislation of many LDC regarding
foreign direct investment); Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of
Technology, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, 6, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE
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Fourth, there are several legal mechanisms available to U.S. businesses interested in engaging in international technology transfer that
offer substantial protection for property rights. These legal mechanisms
include licensing, outright sale, and joint venture agreements.4 Licensing grants permission to use a technology in exchange for a fee or royalty payment. The level of risk to the owner in granting the license is
reflected in the level of the payment. Outright sales of technology
transfer ownership of that technology to the purchaser. The sale price
would, at a minimum, reflect the cost of the investment made by the
seller and the unique nature of the technology. Joint ventures between
the developer of the technology and the foreign purchaser provide another opportunity for technology transfer and profit. This approach encourages the protection of the technology involved by granting a vested
interest in it to the developing country.
These considerations ought to encourage U.S. businesses to engage
in the kind of technology transfer envisaged in the biodiversity treaty.
There are always risks when property is invested in business activities,
let alone international business activities. The U.S. delegation at the
Rio conference was correct to underline them. The language in Article
16 of the biodiversity treaty does allow governments the right to act to
facilitate technology transfer in the interests of their own economic development, but it also recognizes the need for adequate and effective
intellectual property protection. Perhaps that protection could have
been more forcefully underscored in the treaty. Perhaps the Clinton
Administration, at Vice President Gore's urging, will decide to sign the
treaty regardless of the fears voiced by the Bush administration." The
ultimate test for U.S. business interests, however, is whether in the
search for profits, those interests will respond to the call for sustainable
development in a manner that is creative and responsible, as well as
profitable. The reality of life in the global village requires nothing less.

TOT/52 (1988) (discussing the changing environment of international transfer of
technology).

43. See generally Zarco, supra note 30, at 182-184; Kasman, supra note 34, at
168 (arguing that intellectual property rights protection is no stumbling block in transferring environmentally sound technologies).

44. On April 21, 1993, President Clinton announced that the United States would
become a signatory of the Biodiversity Treaty. See N.Y. TIMES, April 22, 1993, at Al.

